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Abstract
Banks can enter new countries either through greeneld entry or by acquiring local banks. I model
the e¤ect of a foreign banks mode of entry on the stability of the local nancial sector. Banks exert
costly e¤ort when they extend credit. Limited liability creates an agency problem which leads to under
provision of e¤ort. I show that the diversication of the foreign banks loan portfolio mitigates the
agency problem, and permits the foreign bank to extend credit during downturns where the local banks
are forced to contract credit. The risk management framework employed by the foreign bank creates a
divergence in the behaviour of a greeneld entrant and an acquirer. The greeneld entrant does not own
a portfolio of local loans, and therefore, it has a greater risk taking capacity than the acquirer. Thus,
competition, and thereby the distortion of the local banksincentives to exert e¤ort, is greater following
greeneld entry than following entry through acquisition.
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1 Introduction
Recent banking crises have sparked a debate about the benets of letting foreign banks enter
the nancial system of less developed economies. The main point of the debate is whether the
e¢ ciency gains from increased competition and improved lending practices outweigh the cost of
greater nancial instability.1 This paper analyses the e¤ects of the mode of entry, i.e. acquisition
versus greeneld entry, on the stability of the local nancial sector. I nd, that greeneld entry
has a more adverse impact on the credit quality of the local nancial intermediariesloan portfolios
than entry via acquisition. Further, I nd a di¤erence in the behaviour of foreign entrants and local
incumbents, and between greeneld entrants and acquirers. Greeneld entrants extend more credit
than acquirers, and are more likely to lend during busts where the local nancial intermediaries are
insolvent.
Through screening and monitoring, banks alleviate market imperfections related to imperfect
information and weak institutional infrastructure. Consequently, bank loans constitute an impor-
tant source of nance in developing economies, and the impact of foreign banks on the local credit
market is therefore particularly important in these economies. Some countries, such as India, have
regulated foreign entry and allow only entry through greeneld operations. This stance may be mo-
tivated by a desire to shelter the local nancial sector from competition, but can have consequences
for nancial stability.
Empirically, the behaviour of foreign entrants depends on their mode of entry. During busts
of the local economy, greeneld entrants expand credit whereas acquirers and local banks contract
credit (Haas and Lelyveld (2006)), the average credit quality of the greeneld entrantsloan port-
folios exceed the average credit quality of the acquirersloan portfolios (Kraft 2002, Majnoni et al.
(2003)), and greeneld entrants charge lower loan rates (Mody and Peria (2004), Clayes and Hainz
(2006)) and expand credit more rapidly that acquirers (Haas and Lelyveld (2006), Kraft (2002)).
The model I present in this paper provides one theoretical rationale for these observations.
I model an economy in which banks, local or foreign, exert costly screening e¤ort when they
1See Allen and Gale (2004) for a survey and discussion of the literature on competition between nancial intermediaries.
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extend credit. Limited liability creates an agency problem which leads to under provision of e¤ort.
The foreign banks loan portfolio is more diversied than local banksloan portfolio. This limits the
foreign banks agency problem and causes it to exert higher e¤ort. The choice of e¤ort a¤ects the
banksprotability, and as the local economy goes through a bust, only the foreign bank remains
solvent. The mechanism through which diversication alleviates the agency problem has similarities
with the mechanisms explored in Diamond (1984) and Cerasi and Daltung (2000).
The models second building block creates a di¤erence in the behaviour of greeneld entrants
and acquirers. The foreign bank manages risk in an economic capital framework, under which, each
of the local economies is allocated a specic amount of economic capital (see for example Deutsche
Bank (2006) or IMF (2007)). The economic capital employed in a given economy is dened as the
losses that the bank would incur, if the economy was to realise a pre-specied "worst case" scenario.
The worst case scenario is set exogenously by the banks credit committee and varies with the state
of the local economy. Thus, in a given economy, the entrants lending capacity is constrained by the
state of the economy, and by the amount of economic capital allocated to the economy. The upshot
of the risk management framework is, that the greeneld entrants lending capacity exceeds the
acquirers lending capacity. This is so, since the acquisition of the targets loan portfolio consumes
part of the acquirers economic capital. This di¤erence in lending capacity implies, that the local
economy can realise a state where it is protable for both the greeneld entrant and the acquirer
to lend, but where the economic capital constraint forces the acquirer to contract credit, i.e. in
certain states the acquirer contracts credit whilst the greeneld entrant expands credit.
The nancial stability analysis indicates, that the credit quality of the local nancial interme-
diaries loan portfolios deteriorates more following greeneld entry than following entry through
acquisition. This e¤ect arises from a link between competition and incentives to undertake costly
screening. Increased competition reduces the banksprot margins and impairs their incentives to
screen borrowers. The greeneld entrants lending capacity exceeds the acquirers lending capacity,
so competition is more erce following greeneld entry. Thus, the local banksunder provision of
e¤ort is more severe following greeneld entry than following entry through acquisition.
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The model suggests, that entry through acquisition can enhance the local banksincentives to
exert e¤ort. An acquisition does not a¤ect the number of players in the local market, and, when
the acquirers economic capital is su¢ ciently low, it may reduce the aggregate lending capacity.
When this occurs, entry through acquisition reduces the competition and enhances the local banks
incentives to exert e¤ort. Greeneld entry unambiguously increases the aggregate lending capacity,
and therefore unambiguously reduces the local banksprovision of costly e¤ort.
A comparison of the predicted protability of greeneld entry to the protability of acquisition
indicates, that greeneld entry is likely in economies which have recently liberalised their nancial
sector. This suggests, that unregulated foreign entry unambiguously destabilises recently liberalised
economies.
An extension of the analysis illustrates, that a deposit insurance scheme enhances the credit
quality of the local nancial intermediaries loan portfolios. Deposit insurance reduces the local
bankscost of funds and enhances their incentives to screen borrowers. By a similar logic, when the
local banks can borrow in an international interbank market, their average cost of funds increases
and the credit quality of their loan portfolios deteriorate. Further, the analysis of the interbank
market indicates, that local banks lose access to the interbank market as the local economy goes
through a bust.
This paper complements an important strand of literature which analyses how competition
between nancial intermediaries a¤ects nancial stability. This literature nds, that increased
competition reduces the nancial intermediariesprots, and thereby enhances their incentives to
underwrite risk (Keeley (1990) and Allen and Gale (2000)) and reduces their incentives to undertake
costly screening (Boot and Thakor (2000) and Boot and Marinµc (2008)).2 Similar to the model
presented below, this suggests that increased competition between nancial intermediaries leads to
greater nancial fragility. The novelty of the model presented in this paper is to highlight a link
between the mode of entry, the entrants behaviour and the stability of the local nancial system.
2One devaition from these ndings is the result presented in Boyd and DiNicoló (2003), which extends the framework of
Allen and Gale (2000) to include a double agency problem (the rst agency problem arises from the nancial intermediaries
limited liability and the second agency problem arises from the entrepreneurslimited liability). Under this extension, increased
competition between nancial intermediaries enhances nancial stability.
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This link arises from the interaction between the entrants risk management framework and the
degree of competition following entry. Most closely related to the analysis below is Boot and Marinµc
(2008). Boot and Marinµc model competition as an increasing function of the number of players in
the local market, and note that since entry through acquisition does not a¤ect the aggregate number
of players, competition is greater following greeneld entry than following entry through acquisition.
In contrast, in the model presented below competition is a function of the banksaggregate lending
capacity. Combined with the modelling of the entrants risk managment framework, this approach
allows for the analysis of acquisitions which a¤ects the governance structure (risk management
framework) of one (or some) of the local banks without changing the aggregate number of players.
This drives the conclusion that foreign entry may reduce overall competition, and allows for the
analysis of how the mode of entry a¤ects the entrants behaviour as the local economy goes through
a bust; a topic which is not addressed in the analysis of Boot and Marinµc.
The work presented in this paper is also related to a number of recent papers that analyse
how entry by foreign nancial intermediaries a¤ects the credit markets of developing economies
(DellAriccia and Marquez (2004), Detragiache et al. (2006), Sengupta (2007), Gormley (2008)
and Schmidt (2008)). This literature considers only greeneld entry, and focus is on how the
foreign entrant overcomes information disadvantages and on how information asymmetries lead
to a segmentation of the local credit market. The model presented below arguments the existing
literaure by highlighting the importance of the foreign banks mode of entry for competition, the
credit available during busts of the local economy and for the nancial stability of the local economy.
Closely related to the questions raised in this paper is Clayes and Hainz (2006) which analyses
how a foreign banks mode of entry a¤ects the lending rates of the local economy. Clayes and
Hainzanalysis is cast in an asymmetric information framework akin to Broecker (1990), and a key
component of their analysis is an exogenously specied di¤erence between the greeneld entrants
and the acquirers information set. In the model presented below, the information sets vary only
with the amount of screening, and ex ante there is no di¤erence between the information available
to the greeneld entrant and the information available to the acquirer. Also, in contrast with the
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analysis in Clayes and Hainz, the analysis below is focussed on how the mode of entry a¤ects the
availability of credit during busts and on the nancial stability of the local economy.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 contains the main
analysis and characterises the equilibrium. Section 4 studies the e¤ect of deposit insurance and of
interbank lending. Section 5 contains an overview of the empirical evidence and section 6 concludes.
All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Basic Setup
The model has three dates (t = 0; 1; 2), universal risk neutrality and no discounting. There is a
continuum of entrepreneurs with mass 2, N  2 local banks, one international bank, a continuum
of depositors and a deposit insurance fund.
At t = 0 and t = 1, a measure of the entrepreneurs with mass 1 have access to an investment
project which requires one unit of nance. The projects mature at t = 2 and have two potential
outcomes, success or failure. Successful projects return X > 1 and unsuccessful projects return 0.
There are two types of entrepreneurs, "Good" and "Bad", which di¤er in their ability to generate
a successful outcome on the investment project. Good entrepreneurs, succeed with probability p < 1
and bad entrepreneurs fail with certainty. The fraction of good entrepreneurs in the economy is
given by  j , where j 2 fl; hg is the state of the economy. I assume that h >  l. The state variable
is realised at time t = 1 and Pr (j = h) = . The entrepreneurs types are unobservable to all
agents in the economy.
The entrepreneurs are penniless, so to initiate the investment project, they must obtain a loan
from one of the banks. The entrepreneursdemand for credit, is a decreasing function of the cost
of credit.3 Let rj;mt be the interest rate on a loan at time t in state j if the foreign bank employs
entry mode m, and let qj;mt be the interest rate as a fraction of the potential surplus on the project,
3 If the entrepreneurs have access to an outside opportunity, the downward sloping demand curve arises endogeneously when
the return on the outside opportunity is heterogeneous across the entrepreneurs (See Di Niccoló and Loukoianova (2007) for an
example of this modelling strategy).
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i.e. qj;mt  r
j;m
t
R , where R  X   1. Then, at time t, the entrepreneursdemand for credit is given
by,
D

qj;mt

= 1  qj;mt for t 2 f0; 1g .
The banks have access to a screening technology, which can provide them with information
about an entrepreneurs type. Screening is subject to a cost of
1
2
c (et)
2 Lt,
where c is a constant, Lt is the amount of credit that the bank extends at time t, and et is the
banks screening intensity (e¤ort) at time t. The fraction of good entrepreneurs in a given banks
loan portfolio is an increasing function of the banks screening e¤ort. I assume, that by exerting
e¤ort et, the bank increases the fraction of entrepreneurs with good projects in its loan portfolio
by a fraction of et. Thus, if the bank exerts e¤ort et and state j is realised, the fraction of good
entrepreneurs out of the total loans the bank extended at time t is  j+et. To ensure that  j+et < 1
for all j, I impose the parameter constraint c > pX
1 h . The screening technology is such that, if
two banks exert the same e¤ort, they obtain the same information about the borrowers. Further,
the information set of a bank with a low screening intensity is a subset of the information set of a
bank with a higher screening intensity. Lastly, screening is set period by period.
The banks are nanced by demand deposits and are supported by a deposit insurance provided
by the deposit insurance fund. In return for the deposit insurance, the banks pay a at fee which
is normalised to zero. The banks are subject to a capital adequacy regulation which requires them
to hold k units of capital per unit of deposits they raise. For a given bank, if the expected value of
its portfolio falls below the value of its liabilities, the deposit insurance fund intervenes and takes
control of the bank.4,5
I assume that the tenure of the loan contracts o¤ered by the banks match the tenure of the en-
trepreneursprojects, and that the loans are non-prepayable.6 The loan applications are distributed
4With this modelling abstraction, the deposit insurance fund takes the role of the nancial regulator.
5Subsequently, I refer to a bank as solvent if the expected value of its assets exceeds the value of its liabilities.
6 In the model, there is no demand for prepayable loans. Banks and borrowers are risk neutral and information is symmetric.
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across the banks at random, with each bank obtaining an equal number of loan applications.
2.2 The local banks
Each local bank has a xed amount of capital, A, so the capital requirement implies, that they have
a lending capacity of Ak . The local banks are protected by limited liability if the losses on their
loan portfolio exceeds their capital. In each period, the local banks choose an optimal screening
e¤ort, and, at time t = 0, they allocate their lending capacity across the periods to maximize the
rent extraction.7 Let m 2 fG;Ag (greeneld, acquisition) denote the foreign banks mode of entry,
and j 2 fl; hg denote the state of the economy. The local banks screening e¤ort at time t in
state j given the foreign bank enters through mode m is denoted em;jt , and its allocation of lending
capacity to time t is given by Lt.
2.3 The foreign bank
The foreign bank is active in many economies, each of which is a replica of the economy described
above. The foreign banks decision to enter the local economy is made at the end of period 1, just
prior to the realisation of the state variable. There are two modes of entry, greeneld banking and
acquisition. If the foreign bank enters through acquisition, it pays  to acquire the local banks
credit portfolio and branch network. If it enters via greeneld banking, it must pay a xed cost,
F  0, to establish a physical presence, and it must build the local loan portfolio from nil. I assume
that the foreign banks screening e¤ort is non-transferrable across the economies, and that the state
realisation is independent across the economies.8
The international bank manages its risk exposure to the di¤erent economies through an economic
Consequently, all agents value the option embedded in a prepayable loan the same. Thus, if the exercise of the prepayment
option is subject to a minimal transaction cost, the demand for prepayable loans is zero.
7Each local bank has a xed lending capacity, so the amount of credit they extend at time t = 0 automatically determines
their lending capacity at time t = 1.
8The assumption of independent state realisation is extreme and is made for expositional purposes. The models predictions
are robust to the assumption that there is a positive correlation across the states of the economies. For example, the state
realisation could be driven by a set of common risk factors and an idiosyncratic component. Similarly, the assumption of
non-transferable e¤ort is made for expositional purposes. A transferable e¤ort would reinforce the models predictions.
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capital framework.9 The economic capital employed in a given economy is dened as the losses
that the bank would incur if the economy was to realise a pre-specied "worst case" scenario. The
worst case scenario is set exogenously by the banks risk management committee and varies with
the state of the local economy. I assume that a loan with notional  in state j consumes economic
capital
 
1  s   j, where s0 > 0, s   j ! 1 for  j ! 1, and s   j ! 0 for  j ! 0. Thus,
if the bank commits economic capital EC to the local economy, in state j, its aggregate lending
capacity is given by EC
(1 s(j)) . Economic capital is allocated across the economies according to an
internal optimization procedure. In the following, I take the outcome of this procedure as given,
and assume that the amount of economic capital allocated to the local economy is EC.10
Upon entry, the foreign bank sets the screening intensity and the amount credit that it is willing
to extend. The foreign banks screening intensity at time t = 1 in state j given that it enters
through mode m is denoted "m;j , and its lending at time t = 1 is given by m;j .
To ensure an interior solution to the local banksproblem, I assume that the lending capacity
of the local nancial sector exceeds the lending capacity of the foreign entrant, that is N Ak >
EC
1 s(j) . Further, to ensure that the banksexpected prots are not completely eliminated by the
competition, I impose the parameter constraint,
N
A
k
+
EC
1  s (h) < 1 
1
R
 
1  p   l + (1  ) h
p ( l + (1  ) h)
!
. (1)
This ensures that lending is protable at time t = 0 and in state h at time t = 1.
2.4 Strategic interaction
The local banks allocate their lending capacity across the periods to maximize their rents, qm;jt R.
The rent extraction a¤ects the entrepreneursdemand for credit, and in equilibrium qm;jt clears
the credit market. In the analysis, I characterise the Walrasian equilibrium where each bank takes
9Many global banks rely on economic capital to manage risk (see Deutsch Bank (2006) or IMF (2007)). In this paper, I
take the state of the global banks risk management framework as given and explore its implications for the credit market
equilibrium. For an analysis of how economic capital and Value at Risk measures a¤ect tradersand loan o¢ cersrisk taking
incentives, see for example Cuoco et al. (2008).
10The analysis compares how greeneld entry a¤ects the local economy relative to how entry through acquisition a¤ects the
local economy. If the internal optimization procedure is independent of the mode of entry, the procedure itself does not a¤ect
the models predictions. This motivates the reduced form approach.
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the entrepreneursdemand for credit and the competitors supply of credit as given. The number
of local banks, N , is nite, so rationality requires, that the banks internalise how their lending
decision a¤ect the behaviour of the competitors and the equilibrium rent extraction. Proposition
6 illustrates, that the features of the Walrasian equilibrium carry through to the setting where the
banks behave strategically.
3 Analysis
3.1 Preliminaries
One of the objectives of the paper is to analyse how the mode of entry a¤ects the entrants ability
to lend as the local economy goes through a bust. Thus, I constrain the analysis to a set of states
such that the local banks are prevented from lending in state l.
Lemma 1 If h  R2+R , then there is a value of  l, L, such that if  l < L, the local banks are
insolvent in state l.
I assume that h  R2+R and that  l < L such that, at time t = 1, the local bank lends only
if the economy is in state h. The constraint on h in Lemma 1 ensures that L is strictly positive.
Given this constraint, I suppress the superscript referring to the state on the local banks choice
variables.
3.2 The local banksproblem
Given the demand for credit and the local banksbeliefs about the foreign banks mode of entry, the
local banks choose their screening intensity and allocate their lending capacity across the periods
to maximize their prots. If the local bank assigns probability  to entry through acquisition, then
the limited liability and the constraint on  l implies, that the local banksproblem is given by,
max
L0;L1;e0;eA1 ;e
G
1



h + e0

pq0R  1
2
c (e0)
2

L0
+ 

h + eA1

pqA;h1 R 
1
2
c
 
eA1
2
L1 +  (1  )

h + eG1

pqG;h1 R 
1
2
c
 
eG1
2
L1
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s:t: L0 + L1  A
k
:
Condition (1) implies, that the local banksexpected prots are positive at time t = 0. Therefore,
the capacity constraint binds. The rst order conditions to the local banksproblem are,
e0 =
1
c
pq0R, (2)
eG1 =
1
c
pqG;h1 R, (3)
eA1 =
1
c
pqA;h1 R, (4)
and, 
h + e0

pq0R  1
2
c (e0)
2    = 0, (5)h


h + eA1

qA;h1 + (1  )

h + eG1

qG;h1
i
pR  1
2
c
h

 
eA1
2   (1  )  eG2i   = 0, (6)
where  is the constraint multiplier.
The local banksoptimization problem does not incorporate the likelihood that the local bank
is acquired at time t = 1. To see why this is so, assume to the contrary, that the potential of
being acquired increased the local banksexpected prots, and caused them to choose a di¤erent
screening intensity and capacity allocation that the one characterised above. Since N  2, the
excess prots from from being acquired would cause the local banks to compete to become the
acquirers preferred target. This competition would drive the expected prots from the acquisition
to zero. But, when the expected prots from the acquisition are zero, the rst order conditions
above characterise the optimal lending and screening intensity. Thus, local banks set their screening
intensity and allocate their lending capacity as if the probability of being acquired is zero.
3.3 The foreign banks problem
The foreign bank is subject to limited liability on the group level.11 Consequently, losses from one
economy must be o¤set against gains from other economies. Losses can be shifted to the deposit
11 In many locations, foreign entrants are required to incorporate a subsidiary in the local economy. This gives the entrant
the option to default strategically. I assume, that the reputational cost of strategic defaults and the permanent loss of the local
banking licence is su¢ ciently strong to prevent strategic defaults.
11
insurance fund only when the foreign banks aggregate prots are zero. When the entrant is active
in many economies, i.e. extends credit in many economies, it behaves as if it was not subject to
limited liability.
Lemma 2 There is a number of economies, M , such that, when the foreign bank is active in at
least M economies, its optimization problem is equivalent to the optimization problem of a bank
which is not subject to limited liability.
Lemma 2 follows from an application of the law of large numbers. When the foreign bank is
active in many economies, the realised return on its loan portfolio equals the expected return on
the portfolio. Thus, limited liability is only valuable if the foreign bank nances entrepreneurs with
unprotable projects in a limited number of economies.12 This implies, that when limited liability
is valuable, the expected prots are bounded. Consider the strategy where the foreign bank lends
only in economies which are in state h. By condition (1), lending is protable in state h, so, since
 > 0 and the state realisation is independent across the economies, the expected prots from this
strategy are strictly increasing in the number of economies. Consequently, there is a number of
economies, M , such that, when the foreign bank is active in at least M economies, the expected
prots from lending only in economies which are in state h exceeds the expected prots from any
strategy which renders limited liability valuable. This implies, that when the number of economies
available the the entrant is su¢ ciently large, then foreign banks optimization problem is equivalent
to the optimization problem of a bank which is not subject to limited liability.
I assume that the number of economies available to the entrant exceeds M .
3.3.1 Greeneld entry
The greeneld entrant chooses its screening intensity and lending to maximize its prots subject
to the economic capital constraint. In state h, the local banks are active, so the entrant takes
12Limited liability is valuable when the foreign bank nances entrepreneurs with unprotable projects in many economies.
However, the law of large numbers implies, that under limited liability, the expected return from nancing entrepreneurs with
unprotable projects in many economies yields an expected prot of zero. In contrast, by nancing entrepreneurs with bad
projects in a limited number of economies, the bank can prevent the law of large numbers from kicking in, and obtain positive
expected prots. Thus, if it nances entrepreneurs with bad projects, it is optimal for the bank to be active in a limited number
of economies.
12
the credit demand as given. In state l, the entrant is the monopoly lender and therefore sets the
monopoly quantity. The greeneld entrant solves,
max
"G;j ;G;j
 
 j + "G;j

p

1 + qG;j1 R

  1  1
2
c
 
"G;j
2
G;j   F ,
s:t:

1  s   jG;j  EC,
for j 2 fh; lg. The rst order conditions to this problem are given by,
"G;h =
1
c
p

1 + qG;h1 R

, (7)
"G;l =
1
c
p

1 + qG;l1 R

, (8)
G;h =
EC
1  s (h) , (9)
G;l =
8<: min

EC
1 s( l) ;
1
2

1  1+
1
2
c("G;l)
2
p( l+"G;l)R
+ 1R

if  l   l
0 if  l <  l
, (10)
where  l is the lowest value of  l such that lending is protable in state l, i.e.  l solves,
 l + "G;l

p

1 + qG;l1 R

  1
2
c

"G;l
2
= 1.
From expression (3) and (7) it follows, that the greeneld entrants screening intensity exceeds
the local banksscreening intensity. This di¤erence between the screening intensities is driven by
the local bankslimited liability. This limits their exposure to losses and distorts their incentives
to undertake costly screening. In contrast, the diversication of the foreign entrants loan portfolio,
eliminates this distortion, and forces the entrant to exert higher e¤ort.
3.3.2 Acquisition
The acquirer chooses its screening intensity and lending to maximize its prots subject the economic
capital constraint. In state h, the local banks are active, so the entrant takes the credit demand
as given. In state l, the entrant is the monopoly lender and therefore sets the monopoly quantity.
Thus, the acquirers problem is,
max
"G;j ;G;j
 
 j + "A;j

p

1 + qA;j1 R

  1  1
2
c
 
"A;j
2
A;j ,
s:t:

1  s   j  A;j + L0  EC,
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for j 2 fh; lg. The rst order conditions to this problem are given by,
"A;h =
1
c
p

1 + qA;j1 R

, (11)
"A;l =
1
c
p

1 + qA;l1 R

, (12)
A;h = max

EC
1  s (h)   L0; 0

, (13)
A;l =
8<: min

max

EC
1 s( l)   L0; 0

; 12

1  1+
1
2
c("A;l)
2
p( l+"A;l)R
+ 1R

for  l   l
0 for  l   l
, (14)
where  l is the lowest value of  l such that lending is protable in state l, i.e.  l solves,

 l + "A;l

p

1 + qA;l1 R

  1
2
c

"A;l
2
= 1.
As in the case of greeneld entry, a comparison of (4) and (11) reveals, that the acquirers
screening e¤ort exceeds the local banksscreening e¤ort. Parallel to the intuition for the greeneld
entrants problem, this observation is driven by the local banks limited liability, and the diver-
sication of the foreign entrants portfolio. The main di¤erence between the greeneld entrants
problem and the acquirers problem arises from the economic capital constraint. The acquisition of
the targets loan portfolio implies, that the greeneld entrant has a greater lending capacity than
the acquirer.
3.3.3 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the cost of credit, qm;jt , clears the credit market. Thus,
(1  q0) = NL0, (15)
1  qG;h1

= NL1 + 
G;h, (16)
1  qG;l1 = G;l, (17)
1  qA;h1

= (N   1)L1 + A;h, (18)
1  qA;l1 = A;l. (19)
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The local banks are rational, so the probability they assign to entry through acquisition, ,
corresponds to the probability that the foreign bank acquires a local bank. In the mixed strategy
equilibrium, the entrant is indi¤erent between the two modes of entry. Let V A be the acquirers
valuation of the targets business at the time of entry, and V L be the targets valuation of its own
business at the time of entry. Then,
V L () = max
eA1 ;e
G
1


h + e0

pq0RL0
+ 

h + eA1

pqA;h1 R 
1
2
 
eA1
2
L1 +  (1  )

h + eG1

pqG;h1 R 
1
2
 
eG1
2
L1; (20)
and,
V A () = max
"A;l;"A;h;A;h;A;l
h
h + (1  )  l + e0

p (1 + q0R)  1
i
L0
+ 

h + "A;h

p

1 + qA;h1 R

  1  1
2
c

"A;h
2
A;h
+ (1  )

 l + "A;l

p

1 + qA;l1 R

  1  1
2
c

"A;l
2
A;l; (21)
s:t:

L0 + 
A;j
 
1  s   j  EC;
for j 2 fh; lg.
Comparison of (20) and (21) reveals, that the acquirers valuation of the targets business di¤ers
from the targets valuation of its own business. The di¤erence in valuation, V A   V L, is driven by
four e¤ects. First, it is increasing in the di¤erence between the acquirers and the targets lending
capacity (A;h versus L1). Second, the acquirer must o¤set the losses from the local economy
against gains from other parts of its business. This forces it to realise the expected losses on the
local banks loan portfolio in state l (the (1  )  l term in the rst term of (21)). Third, the
acquirer honours its liabilities irrespective of whether the projects succeed of fail. Therefore, it
assigns a higher value to the targets liabilities than the target itself (the  1 term in all three terms
of (21)). Both the second and the third e¤ect tend to push V A below V L, and the e¤ects are
diminishing in the targets screening intensity at time 0. Last, the acquirer may be able to lend in
state l, so the di¤erence in valuation is increasing in the protability of state l lending (the third
term of (21)).
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If the foreign bank enters through acquisition, the target learns about the mode of entry. Thus,
a necessary condition for a successful acquisition is,
  V L (1) .
Further, the acquisition must be protable to the entrant, so
V A ()    0.
The entrant mixes between acquisition and greeneld entry when,
V A ()   = V G (; F ) ; (22)
where V G is the value of greeneld entry, that is
V G (; F ) = max
"G;h;"G;l;G;h;G;l


h + "G;h

p

1 + qG;h1 R

  1  1
2
c

"G;h
2
G;h
+ (1  )

 l + "G;l

p

1 + qG;l1 R

  1  1
2
c

"G;l
2
G;l   F , (23)
s:t: G;j
h
1  s

 l
i
 EC,
for j 2 fh; lg.
The value of greeneld entry is increasing in the entrants lending capacity and decreasing in
the cost of establishing a physical presence, F .
The di¤erence between the value of entry through acquisition, V A   , and the value of entry
through greeneld banking, V G, is driven by two e¤ects. First, the greeneld entrant is more e¢ -
cient in its rent extraction, since it sets the optimal screening intensity on the entire loan portfolio.
The screening intensity on the acquirers portfolio is in part determined by the local bank, and
therefore, it is ine¢ cient from the entrants point of view. Second, the acquirer does not incur the
cost of establishing a physical presence, F , but it must pay the acquisition price, .
With these observations, the equilibrium can be characterised.
Lemma 3 Let F be such that,
V G (0; F )  0.
16
The model has at least one equilibrium. In any equilibrium, the banks rent extraction, qm;jt , is
determined uniquely as the positive root of
hq0 +
1
2
pR (q0)
2 = 

hqA;h1 +
1
2
pR

qA;h1
2
+ (1  )

hqG;h1 +
1
2
pR

qG;h1
2
,
where,
qA;h1 = 2  (N   1)
A
k
  EC
1  s (h)   q0,
and,
qG;h1 = 2 N
A
k
  EC
1  s (h)   q0.
At time t = 1, the local bankslend only in state h. The local bankscapacity allocation is given by,
L0 =
1
N
(1  q0) ,
L1 =
A
k
  1
N
(1  q0) ,
and their screening intensity is given by (2) ; (3) and (4). Following greeneld entry, the foreign
banks lending is given by (9) and (10), and its screening intensity is given by (7) and (8). Following
entry through acquisition, the foreign banks lending is given by (13) and (14), and its screening
intensity is given by (11) and (12).13
In equilibrium, the banks rent extraction is determined uniquely as a function of . The
model has at least one equilibrium, and may exhibit multiple equilibria with a beliefs determined
equilibrium selection. A change in the local banksbeliefs about the foreign banks mode of entry
a¤ects the local banksscreening intensity and capacity allocation. This has an impact both on the
price that the acquirer must pay under the acquisition and on the aggregate lending capacity in
period two. The acquirers exposure to the targets loan portfolio, and the di¤erence between the
acquirers and the greeneld entrants lending capacity implies, that a change in the local banks
beliefs a¤ects the protability of the two modes of entry in a non-monotone fashion. This implies,
that multiple beliefs can be supported in equilibrium.
13Recall that the rent extraction determines the banks lending rates.
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Proposition 4 and 5 analyse how changes in the mode of entry a¤ects the local banksincentives
to undertake costly screening. This exercise has two potential interpretations. First, when the
model exhibits multiple equilibria, this can be interpreted as the e¤ect of moving between equilibria.
Second, it describes how a change in the models primitives, say F , a¤ects the local banksbeliefs
and thereby their incentives to undertake screening.
The fraction of good borrowers in the banksloan portfolio determines the return on lending.
In the subsequent, I refer to the fraction of good entrepreneurs in a given banks loan portfolio as
the credit quality of the banksloan portfolio.
Proposition 4 In equilibrium, the following is true;
i) The credit quality of the local banks loan portfolio is increasing in the likelihood that entry is
through acquisition, and decreasing in the likelihood that entry is through greeneld banking, i.e.
@e0
@ > 0, and e
G
1 < e
A
1 ;
ii) When  > 0, there exists an EC such that foreign entry enhances the credit quality of the local
banks loan portfolios. If foreign entry is constrained to greeneld entry, i.e.  = 0, then foreign
entry unambiguously leads to a deterioration in the credit quality of the local banksloan portfolio;
and
iii) Lending rates are increasing in the probability that entry is through acquisition.
Result i) and iii) in Proposition 4 are driven by the impact of the mode of entry on competition
and rent extraction. The rent extraction determines the marginal return on screening and thereby
the local banksscreening intensity. Lending is protable in state h, so the foreign bank exploits
its entire lending capacity when the economy is in state h. The economic capital consumed by
the acquired portfolio implies, that the greeneld entrants lending capacity exceeds the acquirers
lending capacity. Thus, competition is more erce following greeneld entry, and consequently, the
rent extraction and the local banksscreening intensity is lower under greeneld entry.
Entry through acquisition leads to a reduction in the number of local banks. This drives result
ii) of Proposition 4. When the entrants economic capital is low, entry through acquisition can
reduce the aggregate lending capacity. This reduces competition, and increases the local banksrent
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extraction and screening intensity. In contrast, greeneld entry leads to an increase in the number
of banks and unambiguously increases the aggregate lending capacity. Thus, following greeneld
entry, the local banksrent extraction and screening intensity is lower.
The acquirers valuation of the targets business, V A, suggests, that entry through acquisition
is facilitated when the local banks exert a high screening e¤ort at time t = 0. Typically, economies
which have recently liberalised their nancial sector are characterised by lax lending standards and
a history of government directed lending. Thus, in these economies, foreign entry is likely to be
through greeneld banking. Therefore, part i) of Proposition 4 suggests, that unregulated entry
in countries which have recently liberalised their nancial sector is likely to reduce the screening
intensity and credit quality of the local nancial intermediaries loan portfolio.
Under the foreign banks risk management framework, the lending capacity is increasing in  l.
There is a value of  l such that, in state l, the economic capital consumed by the acquired portfolio
exhausts acquirers lending capacity. The greeneld entrant does not own a portfolio of local loans,
so its economic capital constraint is more lax than the acquirers economic capital constraint. Thus,
if the greeneld entrants screening intensity is su¢ ciently high, it nances local borrowers at values
of  l at which the acquirers economic capital constraint forces it to contract credit.
Proposition 5 There exists values of EC and  l such that, in state l
i) if  l < G, no bank lends;
ii) if G   l < A only the greeneld entrant lends; and
iii) if A   l < L both the acquirer and the greeneld entrant lends.
At the lower threshold, G, the fraction of good entrepreneurs is so low, that it is unprotable
for the foreign entrant to lend, even if the lender can extract the entire surplus from the good
entrepreneursprojects. For G   l < A, it is protable for the entrant to extend some credit
in state l, irrespective of its mode of entry. For these parameter values however, the acquirers
economic capital constraint binds and prevents it from lending. The local banks are also prevented
from lending at these parameter values, but their constraint is of a fundamentally di¤erent nature.
The local banksscreening intensity renders their operations unprotable, so insolvency prevents
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them from lending.
The foreign banks ability to lend during busts does not imply that it stabilises the local economy.
Proposition 4 and 5 illustrates that for A >  l  G, the foreign bank lends during the bust, but
its presence increases competition and leads to a lower screening e¤ort by the local banks.
Proposition 6 conrms, that the results from the preceding analysis carries through to a setting
where the banks incorporate the impact of their lending decisions on the equilibrium rents.
Proposition 6 The results from Proposition 4 and 5 carry through to the setting where the banks
behave strategically.
4 Extension of the analysis
This section extends the analysis along two lines. First, it illustrates that the models results are not
driven by the assumption of a perfectly credible deposit insurance. Hereafter, it demonstrates how
the models predictions change when the model is extended to include an international interbank
market.
4.1 Importance of deposit insurance
In the following, I assume that there is no deposit insurance, and that local depositors can withdraw
from the bank at t = 1. If the depositors withdraw from the bank, the banksloans are liquidated
at their expected value, and the proceeds from the liquidation are used to honour the banks
obligations to the depositors. Lemma 7 veries that the results from the previous sections are
maintained when the deposit insurance is eliminated.
Lemma 7 Elimination of the deposit insurance leads to a reduction in the local banks screening
intensity. In state l, the local banks are insolvent for a larger set of parameter values, i.e. there is
an  l, L, with L > L such that, the local banks are insolvent for all  l < L. The results from
Proposition 4, 5 and 6 are maintained with L replaced by L.
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In state l, depositors are subject to a loss since the local banksliabilities exceed the liquidation
value of their assets. To nance the bank at t = 0, risk neutral depositors require a risk premium.
This raises the bankscost of nance and reduces the marginal return on screening. This drives
the deterioration in the credit quality of the local banks loan portfolios. With a lower level of
screening, the local banks are insolvent for higher values of  l, so L > L.
The deposit insurance scheme improves the credit quality of the local banksportfolio by en-
hancing the local banks incentives to undertake costly screening. In addition to the traditional
argument of preventing depositor runs, this provides an argument in favour of deposit insurance.14
4.2 Interbank market
In the following, I assume the existence of an interbank market where local banks can apply for
unsecured credit from risk neutral international nancial institutions. Interbank loans have a tenure
of one period, and, in any given period, the maximum amount of credit available to any borrower
is exogenously xed at D. Let emI;jt be the local banks screening intensity at time t in state j
following entry mode m. I assume that the lenders in the interbank market obtain a repayment of
zero if, at the maturity of the loan, the value of the local banks liabilities exceeds the expected
value of their assets.15
Lemma 8 If h  1
2pX
, the introduction of an interbank market leads to a reduction in the local
banks screening intensity, i.e. eI0 < e0 and e
mI;h
1 < e
m;h
1 . In state l, local banks loose access to
interbank nance. A su¢ cient condition for the results from the previous section to be maintained
is, that the local bankscapacity constraint binds.
The mechanism behind Lemma 8 is akin to the mechanism behind Lemma 7. In state l, the local
banks are insolvent, so, at time t = 0, creditors in the interbank market require a risk premium to
nance the local banks. This raises the local banksaverage cost of nance, reduces the marginal
14See Diamond and Dybvig (1983) for an outline of how deposit insurance can prevent bank runs in a model with multiple
equilibria.
15The models qualitative predictions are not sensitive to the assumption about the repayment of interbank loans when the
local bank is insolvent. Any shortfall in the repayments to interbank lenders lead to the conclusions in Lemma 8.
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return on screening and leads to a lower quality of the loan portfolio. The constraint on h ensures,
that it is protable for the local banks to borrow in the interbank market at time t = 0. In state
l, the local banks are insolvent, and therefore, they cannot obtain interbank credit. Irrespective
of the state, the entrant lends only to creditworthy borrowers and therefore maintains access to
the interbank market. When the local bankscapacity constraints bind, the local banksproblem
is equivalent to the problem analysed in the previous section, with the caveat that the lending
capacity is increased by D. Thus, the results from the previous section holds true.
5 Empirical implications and evidence
The model has a set of empirically testable implications. First, during busts, only foreign banks
extend credit. As the busts becomes severe, only greeneld entrants continues to lend. Second,
the acquisition of the targets portfolio implies, that the average credit quality of the acquirers
loan portfolio is below the credit quality of the greeneld entrants loan portfolio. Third, greeneld
entry leads to a larger aggregate supply of credit than entry via acquisition, and subsequently to
lower lending rates.
A series of empirical studies nd, that as the local economies go through a bust, the foreign
banks expand credit whilst the local banks contract credit.16 Haas and Lelyveld (2006) contains a
detailed analysis of the behaviour of respectively greeneld entrants and acquirers in Central and
Eastern Europe during 1993-2001. They nd, that foreign banks, on average, expand credit during
busts, but that this credit expansion is driven by an expansion by the greeneld entrants and a
contraction by the acquirers.
In the case of Croatia, Kraft (2002) nd, that the quality of the greeneld entrantsassets exceed
the quality of the acquirersassets. This nding is attributed to the absence of socialist era loans on
the greeneld entrantsbalance sheets. Further, Kraft (2002) and Haas and Lelyveld (2006) nd,
that greeneld entrants expand credit more rapidly than acquirers. This suggests, that the quality
16See Goldberg et al. (2000), Mody and Peria (2002) and Peek and Rosengren (2000) for an analysis of foreign banks in
Latin America, or Haas and Lelyveld (2006) and Galac and Kraft (2000) for an analysis of the behaviour of foreign banks in
respectively Central Eastern Europe and Croatia. Schmidt (2007) provides a further discussion of these results, and additional
evidence that foreign entrants expand credit during busts of local economies.
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of the acquired loan portfolio limits the entrants ability to extend credit. This nding is rea¢ rmed
in Crystal et al. (2001). Crystal et al. analyse data for the period 1995-2000 for Argentina, Chile
and Columbia and nd, that foreign banks with an established presence expand credit more rapidly
and have a lower ratio of non-performing loans to assets than foreign banks which have established
their presence through recent acquisitions. These ndings indicate, that the inferior quality of the
acquirersloan portfolio leads to a more conservative lending policy. Majnoni et al. (2003) analyse
a dataset for Hungary for the period 1994-2000 and nd, that greeneld entrantsoperations are
more protable that the operations of acquirers. The di¤erence in performance is attributed to
losses on the acquired portfolio.
For ve Latin American countries during the late 1990s, Mody and Peria (2004) nd, that
foreign acquirers charge higher lending spreads than foreign greeneld entrants.17 This nding is
corroborated in Clayes and Hainz (2006), which analyses foreign bankslending rates in 10 Eastern
European countries during 1995-2003. Clayes and Hainz nd, that local banks reduce their lending
rates signicantly more following an increase in the greeneld entrants market share than following
an increase in the acquirers market share. The authors interpret this nding as evidence that
greeneld entry leads to more intense competition than entry through acquisition.
6 Conclusions
Certain economies restrict foreign banksmode of entry to greeneld banking. This paper has
presented a theoretical framework for the analysis of how the mode of entry a¤ects the credit quality
of the local nancial intermediariesloan portfolio. The analysis indicates, that greeneld entry has
a more adverse impact on the credit quality of the local banksloan portfolio than entry through
acquisition. The mechanism driving this conclusion is, that greeneld entry leads to more intense
competition which reduces the local banksprotability and their incentives to undertake costly
e¤ort. The model has illustrated that the international banks risk management framework can
create a divergence in the behaviour of greeneld entrants and acquirers. Although the greeneld
17The lending spread is dened as the di¤erence between the interest rate on loans and the deposit rate.
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entrants are more likely to extend credit during busts, the conclusion that they enhance nancial
stability more than acquirers is inappropriate as they also have a more adverse impact on the credit
quality of the local banksloan portfolio. The model suggests, that foreign banks are willing to lend
directly to local entrepreneurs during busts, but that they, due to the local banksagency problem,
are unwilling to nance the local banks via the interbank market.
This paper is a rst attempt to understand how the foreign banksmode of entry a¤ects the
nancial stability of the local nancial system. The paper makes some headway but leaves many
questions unanswered. For one, it ignores how foreign entry a¤ects the local banks cost of funds
and their ability to raise deposits. In addition, much empirical work remains to be done in order
to fully understand the implications of the mode of entry on the local nancial system.
A strict interpretation of the models predictions lead to clear policy implications. If local
nancial authorities are concerned about nancial stability, they should favour foreign entry through
acquisition rather than through greeneld banking. However, there are many simplications and
shortcomings in the model presented in this paper, so a more appropriate interpretation of the
results is, that restrictions on the foreign banksmode of entry may have undesired and still not
well understood economic consequences.
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7 APPENDIX
Proof. Lemma 1. Assume to the contrary that the local banks lend in state l. The local banks
optimization problem is,
max
L0;L1;e0;e
A;l
1 ;e
A;h
1 ;e
G;l
1 ;e
G;h
1

h + (1  )  l + e0
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2
c (e0)
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
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1
2
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2
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2
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2
L1
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
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s:t: L0 + L1  A
k
.
The rst order conditions with respect to e¤ort are,
e0 =
1
c
pq0R;
eA;h1 =
1
c
pqA;h1 R;
eA;l1 =
1
c
pqA;l1 R;
eG;h1 =
1
c
pqG;h1 R;
eG;l1 =
1
c
pqG;l1 R:
If

 l + em;l1

p

1 + qm;l1 R

  12c

em;l1
2
< 1 for m 2 fG;Ag, t 2 f0; 1g, lending is unprotable to
the local bank in state l. Inserting the rst order conditions for optimal e¤ort and exploiting that
qm;l1  1, the a su¢ cient condition for the local bank to be insolvent in state l is,
 l <
1  1cp2R
 
1 + 12R

pX
.
Thus, the claim is veried by setting L =
1  1
c
p2R(1+ 12R)
pX . 
L > 0 if 1  1cp2R
 
1 + 12R

> 0. Since
c  pX
1 h and pR < X, a su¢ cient condition for this to be fullled is 
h > R2+R .
Proof. Lemma 2. First, note that
hp

1 + qh1R

  1  p

1 +

1 NA
k
  EC
1  s (h)

R

  1 > 0,
25
where the last inequality follows from condition (1). Thus, it is always protable for the foreign
bank to nance borrowers in economies which are in state h.
If the foreign bank is active in a large number of economies (potentially innite), then, by the
law of large numbers, its optimization problem is given by
max
"m;j ;j
 
 j + "m;j

p

1 + qm;j1 R

  1
2
c
h 
"m;j
2i
j ;
where m 2 fG;Ag and j fh; lg. This is equivalent to the optimization problem for a bank which
is not subject to limited liability. Thus, assume that the foreign bank is active in a number of
economies such that the law of large number is not brought into play. This implies that the banks
prots are limited. Let these prots be given by . To seen that the bank can increase its prots
above  when the number of economies available to the bank is large, consider the limited liability
optimization problem,
max
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As M becomes large, this term converges to
= max
h;M
M max
nh
hpqm;h1 R  (1  p)
i
; 0
o
h
= max
h;;M
M
h
hpqm;h1 R  (1  p)
i
h,
where the second equality follows since hpqm;h1 R (1  p) > 0. This expression is strictly increasing
in M , so for any , there is a value M , M = 

h
hpqm;h1 R (1 p)
i , such that when the number of
economies available to the bank exceeds M , the bank can increase its prots above  by being
active in all the economies which are in state h. Thus if M > M , the foreign banks optimization
problem is equivalent to the optimization problem of a bank which is not subject to limited liability.
Proof. Lemma 3. Substituting the rst order conditions for optimal e¤ort, (4) and (3) into the
rst order conditions for credit allocations, (5) and (6), yields
hq0 +
1
2
pR (q0)
2 = 

hqA;h1 +
1
2
pR

qA;h1
2
+ (1  )

hqG;h1 +
1
2
pR

qG;h1
2
. (24)
The market clearing, conditions (15), (16) and (18), and the rst order conditions to the entrants
problem, (9) and (13), implies
qA;h1 = 2  (N   1)
A
k
  EC
1  s (h)   q0; (25)
qG;h1 = 2 N
A
k
  EC
1  s (h)   q0: (26)
Existence and uniqueness follows from observing that the left hand side of (24) is strictly increasing
and continuous in q0 for q0 > 0, whereas the right hand side by (25) and (26) is strictly decreasing
and continuous in q0 for q0 > 0. For q0 = 0, the left hand side of (24) equals is zero whereas the
right hand side is positive. This ensures a unique solution to (24).
The model may exhibit multiple equilibria with respect to the foreign banks mode of entry. Let
F be such that
V G (; F )  0.
For any given , there is a unique value of F , F  (), which solves,
V A ()   = V G (F; ) .
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Let all equilibrium variables be denoted with the superscript *. To determine F  (), rewrite the
expression for V A,
V A () =

h + (1  )  l + e0
1

ce0 + p

  1

L0
+

1
2

"A;h
2
+

hc+ p

"A;h + ph   1

A;h
+(1  )

1
2

"A;l
2
+

 lc+ p

"A;l + p l   1

A;l;
and rewrite the expression for V G as,
V G = 

1
2

"G;h
2
+

hc+ p

"G;h + ph   1

G;h
+(1  )

1
2

"G;l
2
+

 lc+ p

"G;l + p l   1

G;l   F .
Thus, F  () is given by,
F  () =  

h + (1  )  l + e0
1

ce0 + p

  1

L0
+ 

1
2

"G;h
2
G;h  

"A;h
2
A;h

+

hc+ p

"G;hG;h   "A;hA;h

+

ph   1

G;h   A;h
i
+ (1  )

1
2

"G;l
2
G;l  

"A;l
2
A;l

+

 lc+ p

"G;lG;l   "A;lA;l

+

p l   1

G;l   A;l
i
.
F  () is not monotone in , so the model may exhibit multiple equilibria. Note that if F > F  ()
for all  2 [0; 1], then the mode of entry is always acquisition, and if F < F  () for all  2 [0; 1],
then the mode of entry is always greeneld banking. Existence of the equilibrium follows from the
observation that F  () is continuous. If there is an intersection between F and F  (), then there
is at least one equilibrium in mixed strategies. If there are no intersections between F and F  (),
there is exactly one equilibrium in pure strategies.
V G (; F ) is increasing in , so V G (0; F )  0 implies that the prots from entry are positive.
Thus, it is optimal for the foreign bank to enter. To ensure that the incumbent accepts the entrants
o¤er, let   V L (1). Substituting the equilibrium values of the variables into the expression for
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V L (1) yields,
  V L (1)
= 

h + e0

pq0RL

0 + 

h + eA;h1

pqA;h1 R 
1
2

eA;h1
2
L1.
Last, in state l, the entrant is the monopolist, and e¤ectively chooses qm;l1 to maximize its prots
under the capacity constraint for m 2 fG;Ag. The foreign banks objective function is continuous
and bounded which ensures that there is a solution to the maximisation problem over the bounded
support, qm;l1 2 [0; 1].
The local banks capacity allocation follows from the market clearing. This completes the proof.
Proof. Proposition 4. First note that by Lemma 3, qG;h1 = q
A;h
1   Ak . The screening intensity is
increasing in the rent extraction, so at time t = 1 screening is always higher following acquisition
than following greeneld entry. @e0@ =
@e0
@q0
@q0
@ , and since and
@e0
@q0
> 0, the sign of @e0@ is determined
by @q0@ . To nd
@q0
@ , di¤erentiate (24) with respect to q0 and  to obtain
@q0
@
=
h

qA;h1   qG;h1

+ 12pR

qA;h1
2   qG;h1 2
2h + pR

q0 + q
A;h
1 + (1  ) qG;h1
 .
Since qA;h1 > q
G;h
1 , it follows that
@q0
@ > 0. This veries the rst claim in the proposition. The third
claim is veried by observing that the lending rate is given by rt = q
m;j
t (X   1) and therefore is
increasing in qm;jt for j 2 fl; hg, m 2 fG;Ag. Claim ii) states that when  > 0, there is an EC such
that the local banks screening intensity is higher when foreign banks are allowed to enter than
when they are prevented from entering. To see this, rst derive the equilibrium without foreign
banks. Let qNE;jt denote the banks rent extraction at time t in state h when foreign banks are not
permitted to enter. In absence of foreign bank entry, the local banks problem is equivalent to the
local banksproblem under foreign entry with  = 1, qm;jt = q
NE;j
t and
EC
1 s(h) =
A
k . Plugging this
into equation (24) and (25) yields the equilibrium conditions in the absence of foreign banks,
hqNE0 +
1
2
pR
 
qNE0
2
= hqNE;h1 +
1
2
pR

qNE;h1
2
, (27)
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and,
qNE;h1 = 2 N
A
k
  qNE0 .
Let EC () be the value of EC such that q0 = qNE0 . Thus, from (27) and (24), EC () solves


hqA;h1 +
1
2
pR

qA;h1
2
+ (1  )

hqG;h1 +
1
2
pR

qG;h1
2
= hqNE;h1 +
1
2
pR

qNE;h1
2
.
Exploiting (25) and (26) this expression implies that EC (0) = 0, EC (1) = Ak and
@EC()
@ > 0.
Consequently, for any  > 0, there is a value of EC, EC (), such that if EC < EC () then
q0 > q
NE
0 . Further, if EC <

1  s  h Ak , it follows that qA;j1 > qNE1 . The local banksscreening
intensity is increasing in qm;jt , so it follows that the local banks exert a higher screening e¤ort
when foreign banks enter through acquisition if 0 < EC < min
 
EC () ;

1  s  h Ak . To see
that foreign entry leads to a reduction in the local banksscreening intensity when foreign entry is
constrained to greeneld banking, note that EC (0) = 0, so  = 0 implies that q0 < qNE0 for all
EC > 0.
Proof. Proposition 5. Recall that L =
1  1
c
p2R(1+ 12R)
pX . Let 
G be the lowest value of  l such that
the greeneld entrant can lend in state l, i.e. G solves
 
 l + "G;l

p

1 + qG;l1 R

  12c
 
"G;l
2
= 1,
where qm;j1 = 1. Inserting the rst order conditions for optimal e¤ort yields, 
G =
1  1
2
1
c
(pX)2
pX .
Note that 12 (pX)
2 > p2R
 
1 + 12R

= 12 (pX)
2   12p, so G < L. Let A be the value of  l
such that the acquirers capacity constraints prevents it from lending at t = 1, i.e. A solves
1  s   lL0 = EC ) A = s 1 1  ECL0 . Since s   l ! 0 for  l ! 0, and s   l ! 1 for
 l ! 1, a value of EC can be found such that G < A < L. Since G;l  A;l it follows that
qG;l1  qA;l1 and therefore "G;l  "A;l. Thus , for  2
 
G; A

, it is protable for the acquirer to
lend to local borrowers, but its economic capital constraint prevents it from doing so. Note, that
by the construction of G, it is unprotable for both greeneld entrants and acquirers to lend if
 l < G.
Proof. Proposition 6. Statement i) and iii) of Proposition 4 generalises if, in the setting with
strategic behaviour, @e0@ > 0, and q
G;h
1 < q
A;h
1 . That indeed this is the case is veried below. The
results in Proposition 5 are driven by the agency problem which causes the foreign bank to set
a higher screening intensity than the local banks, and by the observation that the acquirer has a
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lower lending capacity than the greeneld entrant. The foreign banks economic capital constraint,
lending capacity and the agency problem are una¤ected by the banksstrategic behaviour, so the
proof of Proposition 5 is unchanged.
The subsequent establishes existence of the equilibrium, and proves that @e0@ > 0 and q
G;h
1 < q
A;h
1 .
In step one, assume that there is a corner solution to the entrants problem, G;h = EC
1 s(h) and
A;h = EC
1 s(h)   L0. The second step of the proof illustrates that the results hold for 
m;h <
EC
1 s(h) . Let the local banks be indexed by subscript w 2 f1; 2; ::; Ng. In equilibrium, (1  q0) =
N

w=1
L0;w,
 
1  qG1

=
N

w=1
L1;w + 
G;h and
 
1  qA1

=
N 1

w=1
L1;w + 
A;h, where Lt;w is amount bank
ws lends at time t. em;jt;w is the local bank number ws screening intensity at time t is state h
following entry mode m. A representative local bank solves the problem,
max
L0;w;L1;;e0;w;e
A;h
1;w ;e
G;h
1;w


h + e0;w

pq0R  1
2
c (e0;w)
2

L0;w
+ 



h + eA1;w

qA;h1 pR 
1
2
c
 
eA1;w
2
+ (1  )

h + eG1;w

qG;h1 pR 
1
2
c
 
eG1;w
2
L1;w,
s:t:L0;w + L1;w  A
k
.
By assumption, lending is protable in state h, so the local banks capacity constraint is binding.
The rst order conditions are given by,
e0;w =
1
c
q0pR;
eA1;w =
1
c
qA;h1 pR;
eG1;w =
1
c
qG;h1 pR;
and,


h + e0;w

p (q0   L0;w)R  1
2
c (e0;w)
2    = 0;


h + eA1;w

qA;h1   L1;w

pR  1
2
c
 
eA1;w
2
+  (1  )

h + eG1;w

qG;h1   L1;w

pR  1
2
c
 
eG1;w
2   = 0,
where  is the constraint multiplier. In equilibrium, the local banks are symmetric, so L0;w = L0
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and em;ht;w = e
m;h
t . Thus, 
h + e0

(q0   L0) pR  1
2
c (e0)
2 = , (28)


h + eA1

qA;h1   L1

pR  1
2
c
 
eA1
2
+ (1  ) 

h + eG1

qG;h1   L1

pR  1
2
c
 
eG1
2
= . (29)
Thus,

h + e0

(q0   L0) pR  1
2
c (e0)
2 =


h + eA1

qA;h1   L1

pR  1
2
c
 
eA1
2
+  (1  )

h + eG1

qG;h1   L1

pR  1
2
c
 
eG1
2
. (30)
From the market clearing conditions, (15), (16) and (18),it follows that
q0 = 1 NL0,
qG1 = 1 NL1  
EC
1  s (h) ,
and,
qA1 = 1  (N   1)L1  
EC
1  s (h) + L0.
This implies that,
qG1 = 1 N
A
k
  EC
1  s (h)   q0, (31)
and
qA1 = 1  (N   1)
A
k
  EC
1  s (h)   q0. (32)
Exploiting these expressions and di¤erentiating (30) with respect to q0 and  yields,
@q0
@
=


,
where,
 = hp

qA;h1   qG;h1

pR+ eA;h1

1
2
ceA;h1   pL1R

+ eG;h1

1
2
ceG;h1   pL1R

,
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and,
 =
1
c
(q0   L0) (pR)2 +

h

1 +
1
N

+ e0
1
N

pR
+ 

1
c

qA;h1   L1

(pR)2 +

h

1 +
1
N

+ eA;h1
1
N

pR

+ (1  )

1
c

qG;h1   L1

(pR)2 +

h

1 +
1
N

+ eG;h1
1
N

pR

.
From (31) and (32), qA;h1 > q
G;h
1 , which by the rst order conditions to the local banksproblem
implies eG;h1 > e
A;h
1 and therefore e
A;h
1

1
2ce
A;h
1   pL1R

> eG;h1

1
2ce
G;h
1   pL1R

. Thus,  > 0.
Since the local banks capacity constraint it binding,  > 0 for all values of , so by (28)and (29),
(q0   L0) > 0 and

qA;h1   L1

> 0 and

qG;h1   L1

> 0. Thus,  > 0 and,
@q0
@
> 0.
When the foreign banks capacity constraint is not binding, the greeneld entrants problem is,
max
"G;j ;G;j
 
 j + "G;j

p

1 + qG;j1 R

  1  1
2
c
 
"G;j
2
G;j   F;
and the acquirers problem is,
max
"A;j ;A;j
 
 j + "A;j

p

1 + qA;j1 R

  1  1
2
c
 
"A;j
2
A;j ,
for j 2 fl; hg. The rst order conditions for optimal e¤ort are,
"G;h =
1
c
p

1 + qG;h1 R

,
"A;h =
1
c
p

1 + qA;h1 R

.
In state h, the rst order conditions for optimal lending are,

h + "G;h

p
h
1 +

qG;h1   G;h

R
i
  1  1
2
c

"G;h
2
= 0,

h + "A;h

p
h
1 +

qA;h1   A;h

R
i
  1  1
2
c

"A;h
2
= 0,
Substituting the expression for optimal e¤ort into the rst order conditions for optimal lending
yields,
G;h =
1
R
+
hc"G;h + 12c
 
"G;h
2
(h + "G;h) pR
,
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A;h =
1
R
+
hc"A;h + 12c
 
"A;h
2
(h + "A;h) pR
.
In equilibrium the credit markets clear, so 1  qG;h1 = NL1 +G;h and 1  qA1 = (N   1)L1 +A;h
and since 1  q0 = NL0,
qG;h1 = 2 N
A
k
  G;h   q0, (33)
qA;h1 = 2 N
A
k
+ L1   A;h   q0. (34)
Consequently, qA;h1 > q
G;h
1 . Di¤erentiating the expressions for 
G;h and A;h with respect to q0,
and exploiting
@qG;h1
@q0
=  1  @
G;h
@q0
,
@qA;h1
@q0
=
1
N
  1  @
A;h
@q0
,
yields,
 1  @
G;h
@q0
=   1
1 + h + 12
("G;h)
2
h+"G;h
< 0,
1
N
  1  @
A;h
@q0
=  N   1
N
1
1 + h + 12
("A;h)
2
h+"A;h
< 0.
By assumption, the local banksaggregate lending capacity exceeds the entrants lending capacity,
so there is an interior solution to the local banks capacity allocation problem. The rst order
conditions to the local banks problem are unchanged from the analysis when the foreign banks
capacity constraint is binding. Di¤erentiating (30) with respect to  yields,
@q0
@
=

0
;
where  is as above, and
0 = h

1 +
1
N

+ e0
1
N
pR+
1
c
 (pR)2 (q0   L0)
  
"
1
c
(pR)2

qA;h1   L1

+ hpR

@qA;h1
@q0
  1
N
pR

h + eA1
#
  (1  )

1
c
(pR)2

qG;h1   L1

+ hpR  1
N
pR

h + eG1
 @qG;h1
@q0
.
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Since @q
G;h
1
@q0
< 0 and @q
A;h
1
@q0
< 0, the logic used to show  > 0 implies that 0 > 0, and therefore,
@q0
@
> 0.
The proof is concluded by establishing existence. Under market clearing, (33) and (34) are
fullled. This implies that the right hand side of equation (30) is increasing in q0, and the left
hand side of (30) is decreasing in q0. To see this, di¤erentiate the left hand side, and exploit
q0   L0 =
 
1 + 1N

q0   1N to get,
1
c
(q0   L0) +

1 +
1
N

h +
1
N
e0

pR > 0,
and rewrite the right hand side to,


h

qA;h1   L1

+ eA;h1

1
2
qA;h1   L1

pR+ (1  )

h

qG;h1   L1

+ eG;h1

1
2
qG;h1   L1

pR.
Since @q
m;h
1
@q0
< 0, @e
m;h
1
@q0
< 0 and @L1@q0 =  @L0@q0 = 1N > 0 if follows that the right hand side is decreasing
in q0. Further, note that evaluated in q0 = 0, the left hand side of (30) is below the right hand side
of (30). This follows since q0 ! 0 implies that the left hand side goes to  hpL0R  0. The right
hand side goes to


h

qA;h1   L1

+ eA;h1

1
2
qA;h1   L1

pR
+  (1  )

h

qG;h1   L1

+ eG;h1

1
2
qG;h1   L1

pR > 0.
To see the inequality, note that q0 ! 0 implies qm;h1 = 2 N Ak   m;h. By (1) 1 > N Ak + m;h, so
for q0 ! 0, qm;h1 > 1. Thus, qm;h1 > N Ak + m;h > N Ak which implies that 1N qm;h1 > Ak  L1. Since
N  2, the latter term implies that 12qm;h1 > L1, which proves that the right hand side of (30) is
positive for q0 ! 0. Consequently, the right hand side of (30) exceeds the left hand side of (30),
and since both sides are continuous in q0, there is a unique solution to (30).
Proof. Lemma 7. Let m;jt be the interest rate depositors require to nance the local banks at
time t in state j following entry mode m, for j 2 fh; lg and m 2 fA;Gg. In the absence of deposit
insurance, let em;jt denote local banksscreening at time t in state j following entry mode m. The
local banks cannot commit to a specic level of screening, so they take the deposit rate as given.
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The local bank problem is given by,
max
L0;L1;e0;e
A;j
1 ;e
G;j
1

h + (1  )  l + e0

p (q0R  0)  1
2
c (e0)
2

L0
+ 

h + eA;h1

p

qA;h1 R  A;h1

  1
2
c

eA;h1
2
L1
+  (1  )

h + eG;h1

p

qG;h1 R  G;h1

  1
2
c

eG;h1
2
L1
+ (1  ) 

 l + eA;l1

p

qA;l1 R  A;l1

  1
2
c

eA;l1
2
L1
+ (1  ) (1  )

 l + eG;l1

p

qG;l1 R  G;l1

  1
2
c

eG;l1
2
L1,
s:t:L0 + L1  A
k
, for j 2 fh; lg .
The rst order condition with respect to screening in state l, is
em;l1 =
1
c
h
qm;l1 pR  m;l1
i
,
for m 2 fG;Ag. m;l1 solves,
p

1 + m;l1

= 1.
Since p < 1, it follows that m;l1 > 0. This implies that the local banks screening intensity is
lower in the absence of deposit insurance than in the presence of deposit insurance. Thus, an
 l can be found, L, such that L > L and

 l + em;l1

p

1 + qm;l1 R

  12c

em;l1
2
= 1. For
 l < L, depositors withdraw their deposits upon the occurrence of state l. The diversication of
the foreign banks portfolio implies that the foreign entrants cost of funds is independent of the
deposit insurance. Thus, subject to replacing L with L, the results from the main analysis carry
through.

 l + em;l1

p

1 + qm;l1 R

  12c

em;l1
2
< 1
Proof. Lemma 8. Let Dm;jt be the amount of credit the local bank obtains in the interbank
market at time t in state j following entry mode m. Let the interest rate on an interbank loan be
given by the lending rate in the interbank market be given by m;jt . Let ~e
m;j
t denote the local banks
screening intensity in the presence of the interbank market. Lenders in the interbank market are
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risk neutral and, so
1 = p

1 + m;jt

,
 =
1
p
  1.
Thus, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for local banks to obtain credit in the interbank market
is,
hX  1 + ,
h  1
2pX
.
Let LIAm;jt denote the local banksliabilities at time t in state j when the entrant has employed
modem, that is LIAm;jt = L
m;j
t +D
m;j
t

1 + m;jt

>

Lm;jt +D
m;j
t

. The local banksoptimization
problem is given by,
max
L0;L1;~e0;~e
m;j
1 ;D
m;j
t

h + (1  )  l + ~e0

p

1 + q0R  LIA0
(L0 +D0)

  1
2
c (~e0)

(L0 +D0)
+ 
24h + ~eA;h1  p
0@1 + qA;h1 R  LIAA;h1
L1 +D
A;h
1

1A  1
2
c

~eA;h1
235L1 +DA;h1 
+  (1  )
24h + ~eG;h1  p
0@1 + qG;h1 R  LIAG;h1
L1 +D
G;h
1

1A  1
2
c

~eG;h1
235L1 +DG;h1 
+ (1  ) 
24 l + ~eA;l1  p
0@1 + qA;l1 R  LIAA;l1
L1 +D
A;l
1

1A  1
2
c

~eA;l1
235L1 +DA;l1 
+ (1  ) (1  )
24 l + ~eG;l1  p
0@1 + qG;l1 R  LIAG;l1
L1 +D
G;l
1

1A  1
2
c

~eG;l1
235L1 +DG;l1  ;
s:t:L1 + L2  A
k
,
Dm;jt  D,
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for m 2 fA;Gg and j 2 fh; lg. The rst order conditions with respect to screening are,
~e0 =
1
c
p

1 + q0R  LIA0
(L0 +D0)

;
~em;h1 =
1
c
p
0@1 + qm;h1 R  LIAm;h1
L1 +D
A;h
1

1A ;
~em;l1 =
1
c
p
0@1 + qm;l1 R  LIAm;l1
Lm;l1 +D
m;l
1

1A ;
Since LIAm;jt >

Lm;jt +D
m;j
t

, the access to the interbank market leads to a reduction in the
screening intensity. Thus, if it is not optimal to lend to the banks when  l < L, it is not optimal
to lend to them in the interbank market.
When the local bankscapacity constraint binds, the local banks borrow D in the interbank
market, and the local banksand the foreign banks problem are equivalent to the problems analysed
in the previous section, with the caveat the the lending capacity is increased by D. Thus, the
conclusions from the previous section holds true
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